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Abstract
Contact tracing is being widely employed to combat the spread of
COVID-19. Many apps have been developed that allow for tracing to be
done automatically based off location and interaction data generated by
users. There are concerns, however, regarding the privacy and security
of users data when using these apps. These concerns are paramount for
users who contract the virus, as they are generally required to release all
their data. Motivated by the need to protect users privacy we propose two
solutions to this problem. Our first solution builds on current “message
based” methods and our second leverages ideas from secret sharing and
additively homomorphic encryption.
1 Introduction
In this work we present two security and privacy conscious methods that al-
low for users to learn when they have been in contact with someone who is
later confirmed to have COVID-19. The process of informing those who have
previously come into contact with a diagnosed person is called contact tracing
and has traditionally been carried out manually. Recently, many systems have
been proposed to automate this process to enable a fast response to the cur-
rent pandemic. These systems almost exclusively utilise smartphones by tracing
individuals location data or their interactions via Bluetooth. This process is in-
herently intrusive for the individual. While the emphasis during the pandemic
should be on stopping the spread, if users are reluctant to use contact tracing
apps due to privacy concerns they will be rendered useless. In particular, adop-
tion of a contact tracing apps must have a higher “transmission rate” than the
virus itself in order to be effective [6].
∗This work was supported by The Alan Turing Institute under the EPSRC grant
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Solutions have been presented that allow for contact tracing to be done in a
more secure manner. At present the main case study is the TraceTogether
app developed and deployed in Singapore. TraceTogether provides security
between users, but relies on the assumption that the government is honest and
trusted. The government learns everyone who is infected and is able to directly
contact (by phone) those who may be at risk due to exposure. Even though the
assumption of a trusted and non corrupt government is very strong we note they
do not learn anything about interactions of non infected users. Consequently we
feel TraceTogether provides a strong baseline of privacy. Other current solutions
rely on similar assumptions, namely that there is a trusted party that can collect
the tracing information and notify at risk individuals. We believe it is unlikely
that solutions of this nature will be widely adopted in other countries (e.g. the
US and UK) due to differing cultural views regarding the power the government
should be afforded.
Some work has proposed solutions that do not require users to put complete
trust in a third party [5, 6], but to the best of our knowledge these all provide
security at the expense of efficiency as they employ expensive cryptographic
techniques. Our solutions do not rely on any such expensive techniques. Our
first solution, presented in Section 3, is based on sending messages between
stakeholders in the system. We have two versions of this method requiring two
or three separate non-colluding parties who administer the system. One of these
parties is the health care provider (for example the NHS in the UK) and the
others we envision as separate government run servers. We split the roles of the
parties in such a way as to preserve the privacy of peoples interactions.
Our second proposed solution, presented in Section 4, only requires the user
to use a low-cost additively homomorphic encryption scheme to allow parties to
securely send deposits of all their interactions to a server (the government) and
learn if one of their contacts has subsequently been diagnosed. Here we utilise
the user-user interaction to allow “secrets” or one time pads to be exchanged
between the user devices, this allows strong privacy results without the need for
the large overhead often associated with complex cryptography. As a result of
our desire to treat all users, infected and non infected, equally, an interesting
property of this protocol emerged. It allows the government to construct a social
graph of interactions between pseudonyms. We believe this is potentially useful
in the governments analysis of control measures they have implemented.
We believe our solutions provide an improved benchmark for allowing privacy
preserving contact tracing to be realised by building on the already high bar
set by TraceTogether. Moreover, we do not claim this work to be a complete
solution to the problem, however due to its lightweight nature and strong privacy
properties we believe the methods we propose could be of use in combating the
spread of the virus worldwide.
1.1 Contact Tracing via Bluetooth
Our solution to providing secure contact tracing is based on users being able
to exchange Bluetooth signals. With Bluetooth, the proximity of people can
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be estimated by the strength of the signals between their devices. In this way
Bluetooth is able to more accurately determine contacts between people than
GPS location data. Groups of people in buildings will have similar or the same
GPS location data however their relative Bluetooth signal strengths will be
reduced by internal walls, for example.
Determining the exact implementation of Bluetooth technology is out of
scope for this work. Instead we assume that there exists a mechanism for nearby
phones to exchange short tokens if the devices come within 2 meters of each
other, the estimated radius within which viral transmission is a significant risk.
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) features a “broadcast mode”, often used for
advertising, which can be used to send unsolicited messages to all BLE-enabled
devices within range. Within the typical operational range of 10 meters, BLE
can be used to transmit a 21-byte payload and allows proximity estimation
based on the Received Signal Strength (RSS). Within a metre the positioning
uncertainty can be as little as a few centimetres [7].
1.2 Related Work
In this section we review related work. First we consider TraceTogether, the
contact tracing app that is deployed in Singapore. We then look at other pro-
posed solutions to providing privacy preserving contact tracing.
1.2.1 Baseline: TraceTogether
The TraceTogether app [3] was developed by the Singapore Ministry of Health.
It uses the idea of Bluetooth contact tracing outlined in Section 1.1. When
devices are “in contact” the devices exchange random strings as tokens, these
tokens act as a UID for the device for a set period of time. When a user is
diagnosed with COVID-19 the government requires them to release their list of
collected tokens — it is against the law not to cooperate [1]. The government
also has a database that links the tokens to phone numbers and identities,
allowing them to directly contact those who have been in contact with the
infected user.
This method requires the state to have a high level of control over the process.
In particular, there is no privacy for users who become infected. The government
learns all contacts an infected user has had which is not desirable, and unlikely
to be tolerated in other countries.
The app does however offer privacy for users with respect to passive snoopers
and other users. This is realised by allowing the user to generate a fresh token
for each new time interval. To the best of our knowledge this is every 30 minutes.
We take the TraceTogether app as a baseline and look to improve on the
level of user privacy in this work. Namely our methods provide higher levels of
privacy, independent of government policy, for infected users.
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1.2.2 Decentralised Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP3T)
In Decentralised Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP3T) [2] the authors
propose a decentralised design that allows for private contact tracing. This
means there is no central collection of potentially sensitive user information. In
contrast our set-based protocol provides the government with a pseudonymised
version of the interaction graph and our message-based protocol leaks a subset
of that graph containing the interactions where one party is infected. Therefore
our implicit assumption is that the government cannot or does not try to de-
pseudonymise this graph. Consequently, their state adversary is stronger than
ours.
Their design however has the downside that a list of infected user’s broad-
casts is made public. This allows users to tell which of their contacts have
been infected. Our system was designed on the basis that this leakage was
unacceptable.
We believe DP3T is a strong proposal for privacy preserving contact tracing.
Moreover, due to our different assumptions into what attacks are acceptable and
feasible we feel our work complements theirs at this early stage of research into
this area.
1.2.3 Alternative Solutions
Research on providing methods for privacy preserving contact tracing is fast
evolving. Here we highlight three main works from the current literature.
Cho et al. [6] discuss and informally define privacy notions that capture
the requirements of privacy preserving contact tracing. These are the privacy
notions we consider our work with respect to. The authors present methods
that extend the ideas of TraceTogether to provide slightly better privacy as well
as a private messaging system which provides higher levels of privacy. We note
however, the authors only present a high level view of how such a system may
work. We leave a discussion of their message based protocol to Section 3 before
we present our own message based protocol.
Berke et al. [5], use GPS location data instead of the Bluetooth method we
introduced in Section 1.1. Their proposal uses Private Set Intersection (PSI), a
heavyweight cryptographic technique that can securely compute the intersection
of two sets. As far as we can see the authors do not report on the estimated
performance or overhead of their system. They propose that intermediary steps
could be taken, by removing the PSI, to speed up performance, however this
will reduce the privacy of the protocol.
2 Background
In this section we introduce the relevant background needed for the rest of
the paper. First we introduce the privacy notions outlined in [6]. Second, we
introduce additively homomorphic encryption schemes, we employ these in our
set-based protocol in Section 4. Finally, we introduce the parameters of the
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problem we are considering along with the assumptions we make on Bluetooth
technology.
2.1 Privacy for Contact Tracing
Cho et al. [6] introduce three notions of privacy that they deem relevant to the
analysis of contact tracing protocols. Privacy from snoopers, from contacts and
from the authorities are used as a framework for evaluating several existing and
new approaches in their study.
Privacy from Snoopers
Snoopers are passive adversaries that capture communications between users
and aim to learn a detailed view of their activities. The issue of privacy from
snoopers has received significant attention in the broader context of location
aware services [12] and is primarily addressed with techniques that obfuscate
the relationship between each user and the pseudonyms that they use when
interacting with a service [4]. The Singaporean TraceTogether contact tracing
app provides privacy from snoopers in the form of time-limited pseudonyms
which obfuscate each users interactions over any period in which more than a
single pseudonym is used.
Privacy from Contacts
Raskar et al. [13] report that there is a genuine fear of persecution in some
communities for being identified as a carrier of the virus. Privacy from contacts
concerns an adversary that is also a user of the system. Rather than just
passively listening to user communications, contacts also learn whether or not
they have been exposed to any risk of infection. Ideally, contacts would learn
only whether they have a risk of being infected and would not learn which of their
contacts had exposed them. This means that while users who only ever contact
one other individual before learning their infection risk unavoidably learn the
infection status of that contact, an average user should not be able to determine
the source of their potential exposure. The TraceTogether app provides optimal
privacy from contacts under the assumption of a trusted government. Users are
directly contacted by the authorities to inform them of their infection status
and so learn nothing more than the single bit which is necessary.
Privacy from the Government
Privacy from the government can be interpreted in a number of ways. In the
most naive implementation, a government might be trusted to learn about the
movements and interactions of every individual. Upon learning about an infec-
tion, the government could perform a detailed analysis of everywhere the user
had been and determine every possible transmission of the virus that may have
occurred. Despite placing a high degree of trust in the government, the Singa-
porean TraceTogether solution does offer better privacy from the government
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than the naive approach. The two main techniques for privacy from the gov-
ernment used in TraceTogether are the decentralisation of data storage and the
principle of data minimisation. Firstly, user contact is recorded by each mobile
device running the app and is not routinely transmitted to the government.
Secondly TraceTogether does not collect any user location data. Despite these
steps, the government does learn the personal identity of any user that may
have risked infection. Ideally, privacy from the government would extend both
to hiding all user interactions and to providing user-control over infection status
reporting.
2.2 Additively Homomorphic Encyrption
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) allows for arbitrary computation over
encrypted data. Such schemes currently, however, have tremendous overhead
and are thus not yet practical for most real world applications. While FHE
allows an arbitrary number of operations, schemes permitting only limited com-
putation over ciphertexts can be vastly more efficient. In our protocol in Section
4, we must test for equality of plaintexts over encrypted values. This can be ac-
complished efficiently using an additviely homomorpic encryption scheme. Here
we show a method for computing equality over encrypted values using an addi-
tively homomorphic scheme.
Let enc be an encryption scheme, it is said to be additive if
enc(m0) + enc(m1)
is a valid encryption of m0 + m1.
Our use case for such schemes in Section 4 is as follows: we want to learn if
two plaintext messages m0 and m1 are equal based on their ciphertexts, c0, c1.
Using the additive property of the encryption scheme we are able to compute
enc(r · (m0 −m1)) for r 6= 0. If m0 = m1 then enc(r · (m0 −m1)) = 0.
Additive homomorphic encryption schemes have been well studied. In this
work we base our analysis of overhead in Section 4 on the Paillier encryption
scheme [11].
2.3 System Model and Assumptions
In this section we introduce parameters we use throughout the rest of the paper.
Some should be determined by medical experts, others should be determined at
the time of implementation.
• Let x be the distance at which the virus can be transmitted from person
to person.
• Let s be the time interval people need to be at a distance x or less from
each other for there to be a risk that the virus is transmitted.
• Let N be the number of days during which a person can be infectious
before diagnosis, currently this is deemed to be 14 days.
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• Let t denote the time a users UID (a random string) is associated with
their device. In TraceTogether this time period is 30 minutes.
We explicitly list the assumptions we make regarding Bluetooth technology.
• Devices that are within x meters of each other for time s are able to
transmit a 20-byte payload1.
• User devices are able to sample a random uid ∈ {0, 1}128 and a random
share ∈ {0, 1}4. We deem the space of UIDs to be sufficiently large for
collisions not to occur, even if users generate new UIDs every 20 minutes2.
3 Message Based Protocol
The protocols we develop in this section are an extension of the ideas behind
the TraceTogether app. We start by introducing and discussing the basic idea
for a message based protocol as presented by Cho et al. [6].
Cho et al. reduce the level of trust a user must place in the government
by assuming that Alice and Bob can interact with the Government through an
anonymous transport layer. The authors suggest this could be implemented
using two non-colluding third parties operating a message relaying service. To
realise this, however, the authors sacrifice three important properties of the
above algorithm.
1. Due to the anonymity of Bob, anyone wanting to spread panic could take
the role of Bob and declare themselves infected when they are not, without
being caught doing so.
2. As a consequence of Alice’s anonymity she must poll the server every time
she wants an update on whether any of her contacts have been diagnosed.
The absence of push notifications could lead to delays in notifications
arriving.
3. If the mixing service is set up especially for this purpose then whoever
Alice contacts directly can learn whether she has received any updates
from the size of the response.
In the protocols we present here we avoid these issues by making more exten-
sive use of the fact that we are assuming the presence of non-colluding parties.
We consider two users Alice and Bob. Bob is a user who may or may not be
diagnosed and Alice is a user who wishes to know if any of her contacts have been
diagnosed. In practice every user will play both of these roles. We call the central
authority Grace (alliterative with government). In our proposed extensions
we introduce Henry (a health care provider) and Mary (a messenger service)
1We make this assumption based on [8].
2A city of 10,000,000 users each changing their UID every 20 minutes would only need 233
UIDs over a 14 day period.
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Figure 1: Overview of our message based contact tracing protocol.
also. We split time into periods, we suggest periods of roughly 30 minutes to
allow each user to change the unique identifier they transmit regularly. This is
standard across all solutions of this nature, making it much harder for snoopers
to track users across time by listening for their beacons.
3.1 Our Message Based Protocols
In both of the message based protocols we propose we use public key cryptog-
raphy. Any semantically secure public key cryptography scheme suffices, we do
not, in this section, require any extra properties such as homomorphism. Users
have a fresh randomly (or pseudorandomly) generated UID for each time period
for each person, we suggest taking these to be uniformly distributed in {0, 1}128,
though any set large enough to avoid collisions will suffice.
Let the public key encryption scheme we use be denoted by (key-gen, enc, dec),
CTR(t, n) be the counter mode of a pseudorandom number generator with key
t and counter n. Let ⊕ denote a bitwise exclusive or operation.
Protocol 1
We introduce two extra parties. Firstly, Henry, the healthcare provider, directly
confirms that Bob has COVID-19. In any normal situation this party will learn
the identity of Bob and that he has COVID-19, thus we do not consider this a
privacy breach. Given Henry knows Bob’s identity, we will guarantee that he
doesn’t learn who Bob has been interacting with. This is achieved by Henry
sending anonymised information to Grace. This addresses the first concern we
highlight regarding the method from [6] above. Secondly, we introduce Mary
who will play the role of relaying messages between Alice and Grace thus sep-
arating Grace from the identity of Alice. This addresses the second concern as
Grace can now push messages via Mary to Alice as soon as they are ready. The
third concern is still a problem as Mary can see when Alice is sent a message
by Grace. To address this we propose that Grace send cover traffic, at random
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times, to Alice even when she has not had a close contact. To Mary this will be
indistinguishable from the real messages and Mary will thus not be able to tell
whether Alice has received a real message. We now describe the actions of the
protocol in more detail.
Setup: When Alice/Bob installs the app they each receive a public key be-
longing to Grace, pkG. When Alice installs the app she randomly chooses two
seeds sA and tA. The seed sA will be used to generate all her future UIDs, whilst
tA will be used to mask communications between her and Grace. She then sends
(sA, tA) encrypted with pkG to Mary. Mary generates a pseudonym pA records
that it corresponds to Alice and forwards the pseudonym and encrypted message
to Grace.
1. Bob and Alice receive pkG after installing the app.
2. Alice generates seeds sA and tA.
3. Alice sends dA = enc(pkG, (sA, tA)) to Mary.
4. Mary assigns a pseudonym pA to Alice.
5. Mary send (pA, dA) to Grace.
6. Grace decrypts dA, sets nA = 0 and stores (pA, sA, tA, nA).
Interaction: During each time period Alice derives her UID for that period
uidA form the seed sA. When Bob and Alice interact they exchange UIDs. Bob
maintains a set uidsB of all UIDs he has seen in the last 14 days.
1. At the beginning of time period j Alice generates uidA = CTR(sA, j).
2. Alice broadcasts uidi throughout the time period using BLE.
3. If Bob comes into proximity of this broadcast he stores uidA together with
a timestamp for 14 days in a set uidsB
Inform: When Bob is diagnosed, he gives Henry an encryption under pkG of
the current uidsB . Henry then passes this on to Grace who decrypts them and
finds the pseudonym pi corresponding to each one. For each pi present (with
duplicates removed) Grace prepares a message, mi, informing the user of a close
contact (possibly with some indicator of the extent of the contact). She then
masks these messages with a mask generated from ti and sends them labelled
with the pi to Mary. From the pseudonyms Mary can tell where each message
should be forwarded to and Alice receives her message.
1. Bob computes uidsB,enc = enc(pkG, uidsB) and sends this to Henry, who
passes it to Grace.
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2. Grace decrypts the message to find uidsB and looks up the corresponding
pi.
3. For each distinct pi, Grace prepares a message mi, increments ni, sets
Mi = (ni,CTR(ti, ni)⊕mi) and sends (pi,Mi) to Mary.
4. Mary forwards Mi to the user i.
5. Alice recovers mi and acts accordingly.
Cover: Grace sends cover traffic to every pseudonym she currently holds on an
ongoing basis. For each pseudonym, Grace will send dummy messages to Mary
with each consecutive pair of messages3. These messages will consist of the
pseudonym and a masked dummy message. These messages will have exactly
the same format as the messages Mary receives in the Inform phase.
1. Grace intermittently increments nA and sends a message
MA = (pA, nA,CTR(tA, nA)⊕⊥)
to Mary.
2. Mary forwards MA to Alice.
3. Alice recovers a ⊥ and ignores it.
The biggest complicating factor in the design of the above protocol is the
desire to have push notifications to Alice whilst not allowing whichever party
contacts Alice to know she is being informed of a close contact. If we allow Grace
to learn who is receiving these notifications (but not who they had contact with
to receive it) then we can manage with one fewer non-colluding party as the
roles of Mary and Grace can be merged.
3.1.1 Protocol 2
If we relax the need for instant notification and allow say a 30 minute delay, then
the alternative protocol, we present now, allows Mary’s role to be merged into
Henry’s. The setup and interaction steps are exactly the same as for Protocol
1 except the role of Mary is now played by Henry. The inform and cover steps
are now replaced by a record step and a poll step.
3These messages should be separated by an independent exponentially distributed time
period with some fixed mean. This ensures that the probability of seeing a cover message in
the next second is independent of previous messages. Thus the cover provided is uniform.
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Setup: When Alice/Bob installs the app they each receive a public key be-
longing to Grace, pkG. When Alice installs the app she randomly chooses two
seeds sA and tA. The seed sA will be used to generate all her future UIDs,
whilst tA will be used to mask communications between her and Grace. She
then sends (s, t) encrypted with pkG to Henry. Henry generates a pseudonym pA
records that it corresponds to Alice and forwards the pseudonym and encrypted
message to Grace.
1. Bob and Alice receive pkG after installing the app.
2. Alice generates seeds sA and tA.
3. Alice sends dA = enc(pkG , (sA, tA)) to Henry.
4. Henry assigns a pseudonym pA to Alice.
5. Henry send (pA, dA) to Grace.
6. Grace decrypts dA, sets nA = 0 and stores (pA, sA, tA, nA)
Interaction: During each time period Alice derives her UID for that period
uidA form the seed sA. She broadcasts it around her and when she comes into
Bob’s proximity Bob records it. Bob maintains a set uidsB of all UIDs he has
seen in the last 14 days.
1. At the beginning of time period j Alice generates uidA = CTR(sA, j).
2. Alice broadcasts uidi throughout the time period using BLE.
3. If Bob comes into proximity of this broadcast he stores uidA together with
a timestamp for 14 days in a set uidsB
Record: When Bob is diagnosed, he gives Henry an encryption under pkG of
the current uidsB . Henry then passes this on to Grace who decrypts them and
finds the pseudonym pi corresponding to each one. For each pi present (with
duplicates removed) Grace then prepares a message, mi, informing them they
have been in a close contact (possibly with some indicator of the extent of the
contact). She then masks these messages with a mask generated from ti and
stores them labelled with the pi ready to be sent to Henry.
1. Bob computes uidsB,enc = enc(pkG, uidsB) and sends this to Henry, who
passes it to Grace.
2. Grace decrypts the message to find uidsB and looks up the corresponding
pi.
3. For each distinct pi, Grace prepares a message mi, increments ni, sets
Mi = (pi, ni,CTR(ti, ni)⊕mi) and stores Mi to be sent later.
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Sending: Periodically (say every 30 minutes), Grace send a message to Alice.
If there is a message stored in a recent record phase but not yet sent then Grace
sends this, otherwise Grace sends an encryption of a dummy message.
• Every 30 minutes, if there is a stored message MA Grace sends this to
Henry. Otherwise she increments nA and sends a message
(pA, nA,CTR(tA, nA)⊕⊥)
.
3.2 Privacy of our Message Based Protocols
3.2.1 Privacy from Snoopers
In both protocols users change UID to something uncorrelated between every
time period it would thus be hard for a snooper to track individuals by the UIDs
they broadcast. Therefore we have privacy from snoopers in both protocols.
3.2.2 Privacy from Contacts
In the interaction phase contacts learn nothing more than snoopers therefore
this phase alone cannot compromise privacy from contacts. The only other
information that users receive is in the form of messages that are sent to Alice
in the inform and sending phases. Alice is not informed by the system who
triggered the sending of this message. We could imagine that Alice is aware
that she has only interacted with Bob in the last fortnight or knows that Bob
has just received test results, in this case information is leaked to Alice about
Bob. However this is also leaked by any protocol that informs Alice in a timely
manner so we consider this to be an acceptable amount of information to leak.
3.2.3 Privacy from Government
For privacy from the government we first consider the case of no collusion.
Starting with Protocol 1 in which:
• Henry learns who he has diagnosed and how many UIDs they have col-
lected. The first is not a breach as he knows this anyway, the second might
be considered a problem but could be fixed by getting Bob to generate
lots of dummy UIDs to submit. This is a cost that would only be paid
upon being diagnosed and would prevent Henry from learning the number
of UIDs submitted.
• Grace gets a psuedonym for each user and is able to tell which of them
have been in contact with the same diagnosed people, how much and when.
We argue that this could be acceptable as breaking the pseudonymity can
be argued to be sufficiently hard so as not to happen.
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• Mary learns who is using the app. On top of that Mary learns when
people are receiving messages. This leakage will be negligible provided the
cover traffic is intense enough compared to the intensity of the messages
informing Alice of the diagnosis of a contact.
Whilst in protocol 2:
• Grace learns the same as in protocol 1.
• Henry learns the same as in protocol 1 plus who has downloaded the app.
We now consider the cases of collusion. In the first protocol:
• If Grace colludes with Mary they learn what Alice is being informed of.
• If Grace colludes with Henry they can learn how many people Bob has
been in contact with and, psuedonymously, for how long and when.
• If Mary colludes with Henry they may be able to figure out who Bob has
been in contact with (by matching messages they exchange with Grace on
the basis of timing).
• If Grace colludes with snoopers then snoopers are enabled to track people.
• If Henry colludes with snoopers then he can learn who Bob has been in
contact with.
However even if Grace, Henry and Mary all collude in the first protocol or
if Grace and Henry collude in the second, they would still learn no more than
what the government learns in BlueTrace. In particular, no information is leaked
about contact between two people neither of which has been diagnosed.
3.2.4 Correctness
Due to information about a diagnoses having to go through Henry it is not
possible for Bob to lie and say he has a diagnosis in order to cause panic. After
Bob’s diagnosis Alice will be informed of having had a contact with a diagnosed
person, virtually instantaneously in protocol one and within thirty minutes in
protocol two.
In these message based protocols there is an advantage in that the message
can be used to convey auxiliary information, such as an estimate of the likelihood
Alice has been infected. This would be computed by Grace and could be based
on how many times she has been in contact with Bob, for how long, at what
estimated distance and when the contact happened in relation to when Bob is
estimated to have been contagious.
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4 A Set-Based Protocol: Enhanced Privacy from
the Government using Additively Homomor-
phic Encryption
This section introduces our second approach to private contact tracing. At a
high-level, our idea is to supplement the UIDs exchanged between users who
engage in close-contact encounters with an additional 4 bit secret value, a one
time pad. Every day, each user will interact with the government by uploading
a list of tuples composed from every UID sent during an encounter in the last
N days and a corresponding 4 bit infection status indicator. If a user is infected
then they will upload a 4 bit value equal to the secret value from their initial
encounter, otherwise will upload a random other value.
Each user holds a public key pair for an additively homomorphic encryption
scheme that they generate at the start of the protocol. Users periodically check
their infection status by sending their public key alongside the list of newly
encountered UIDs and the encryption of the corresponding secret 4 bit values,
to the government. The government encrypts the corresponding 4 bit values
uploaded by each of the UID owners using the public key and then computes
the equality over the encrypted pairs. All of the encrypted equalities, each
equivalent to learning an infection status, are returned to the user.
The additively homomorphic contact tracing protocol we propose can be
split into the following three stages:
1. Close-contact interactions are recorded.
2. Each user periodically sends their record of interactions and their infection
status to the government.
3. The government is periodically queried to learn of potentially infectious
interactions.
In more detail, stage 1 occurs whenever two people come into close contact
with each other as defined in Section 2.3. Stage 2, which occurs periodically
such as every 24 hours, occurs when users upload pseudonym records of their
close contact interactions to the government. Finally in stage 3, which also
occurs periodically, each user learns whether any of their recorded interactions
could have been infectious.
Stage 1: Contact Recording The first stage of our protocol involves an
arbitrary pair of users Alice and Bob that each hold a UID uid ∈ {0, 1}128 and
a secret share s ∈ {0, 1}4 for the current period. Alice and Bob run the following
protocol:
1. Let (uidA, sA) and (uidB , sB) denote the random UID and share tuples
that Alice and Bob, respectively, hold for the time period in which they
meet.
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Alice
Bob
Grace
uidA uidB
1.
2. {...
,(uidA
,iA)} 
 
3. {...,enc(pk
A , i
B )}
4. {..., enc(pk
A ,s
B)-enc(pk
A ,i
B)}
Figure 2: Overview of our set based contact tracing protocol.
2. Alice sends Bob (uidA, sA) and Bob sends Alice (uidB , sB).
3. Alice and Bob each add their individual UIDs, share values, and a times-
tamp t and to the received tuple which is then added to the set of tuples
they hold for all their interactions in the last N days. In this instance:
• Alice holds the set contactA = {. . . , (uidB , sB , uidA, sA, tB)}.
• Bob holds the set contactB = {. . . , (uidA, sA, uidB , sB , tA)}.
Stage 2: Status Reporting The second stage of our protocol involves a
user of the system, Alice, and the government or service provider G. Alice will
upload the set of tuples which comprises all of the UIDs she has communicated
to another user during that day and a corresponding 4 bit infection status value.
Using the contactA set described in Stage 1, then if Alice is known to be
infectious she will upload the set of tuples for the last day comprising all of her
personal UID values and “secret” shares from contactA. If Alice is not infectious
then she sends the same UID values but instead each with a random, other 4 bit
value. G then takes the union of all such sets sent by all users. In more detail:
1. Each user K constructs a status update set and sends it to G. The status
update set comprises tuples of all of the UID values communicated in Stage
1 during the last day and the corresponding 4 bit infection status. If the
user is infected then the infection status value ik is set to the “secret”
share value s1,K from each interaction, otherwise a random other 4 bit
value iK
$←− {0, . . . , 15} \ s1,K is chosen.
The sets that Alice and Bob construct are given below. Here t denotes
the day the update set corresponds to i.e. the current day.
status-updateA,t = {. . . , (uidA, iA)}
status-updateB,t = {. . . , (uidB , iB)}
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2. At the end of this stage, G holds the status sets for all users for the last
N days.
Stage 3: Infection Learning The third stage of our protocol involves a user
of the system, Alice, and the government or service provider G. Alice will learn
her infection risk by sending her public key, her set of encountered UIDs and
the additively homomorphic encryption of the corresponding secret 4 bit values
to the government. The government encrypts the latest 4 bit values uploaded
by each of the encountered UIDs using Alice’s public key and then computes
the equality over the encrypted pairs. All of the encrypted inequalities, each
equivalent to learning of a contact risking infection, are returned to the Alice.
Alice finally decrypts the inequalities to learn if she has had an encounter that
could have risked infection.
Alice holds her public key pair (pkA, skA) and her set of contact recordings
contactA. The government holds the set of all interactions interactionsG. The
Stage 3 protocol is as follows:
1. Alice builds a set interacted -UIDsA comprising of all the additively homo-
morphic encryptions of the secrets shared in all Stage 1 encounters in the
last N days. Alice sends her public key pkA and the set interacted -UIDsA
to the government. Assuming Bob was her last interaction, the set is be-
low, we denote the additively homomorphic encryption scheme by enc4:
interacted -UIDsA = {. . . , enc(pkA, iB)}
2. Alice sends interacted -UIDsA to the government.
3. For UID a user has encountered for which the government has received
a infected status update from during Stage 2 of the protocol, it encrypts
the corresponding status using Alice’s public key pkA. Next using the
additively homomorphic properties of the underlying encryption scheme,
the government is able to compute the (encrypted) inequality between
all of the encrypted user status indicators and the secret share values
uploaded by Alice. If the government does not hold a given UID, or the
status has not been updated for a “long” time, it is ignored. Finally, the
government returns all of the encrypted status indicators to Alice.
4. Alice decrypts all of the ciphertexts sent to her by the government and
learns whether she may be infected or not. Any ciphertext decryption
that has the value 0 indicates that one of Alice’s contacts has reported a
positive infection status.
To compute the inequalities in Step 3 we can use any additive homomorphic
encryption scheme, such as Paillier [11], as described in Section 2.2.
4It is important that order is preserved between this set and the status update sets sent
by each user.
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4.1 Privacy of Our Set-Based Contact Tracing Method
Here we briefly consider the privacy of our set-based contact tracing protocol in
relation to the terms introduced in Section 2.1.
Privacy from Snoopers Compared to the Singaporean TraceTogether solu-
tion which we use as a baseline, our set-based protocol has equivalent privacy
from snoopers. In particular, privacy from snoopers is essentially determined
by our “pseudonym change strategy” of time-limited pseudonyms (UIDs) which
remains unchanged from the TraceTogether design.
Privacy from Contacts Each user only learns how many of their interactions
in the last N days exposed them to an individual who has reported an infection.
Compared to TraceTogether this reveals more as there users only learns exactly
what the government wants them to about infectious contacts. Our protocol,
however, benefits from not depending on government policy and treats all users
equally, infected or not.
Privacy from the Government Our set-based protocol offers user-controlled
infection status disclosure. Uniquely, to the best of our knowledge, our pro-
tocol is the first to offer privacy from the government that is not dependent
on infection status. Regardless of their infection status, all users report the
pseudonymous identities they have exchanged and request infection indication
values from the pseudonyms they have encountered. This does reveal more
to the government than the TraceTogether solution which only discloses user
behaviour for infected individuals, however our protocol never reveals to the
government whether any user is infected or not — which we believe to be a far
more important privacy property.
Whilst this extra leakage may seem counter-intuitive, there are some unique
advantages to our approach. Our set-based protocol ensures that only the user
who may be at risk learns that one of their interactions could have caused them
to become infected. The responsibility is then with the individual to get tested,
self-isolate or seek treatment depending on their circumstances. In addition,
the government can build a graph of pseuodonymous interaction that could
allow it to model the impact of social distancing policies and in-turn make more
accurate predictions about the spread of the virus and the implied demand for
care resources.
5 Overhead/Performance
In this section we consider the overhead and performance of the protocols we
propose in this work. We look at the local storage requirements on the user and
the overhead that is incurred. To approximate the overhead and performance
of our protocols we make the following assumptions.
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We note, in this version of the paper, we only intend to give an approximation
of the overhead and performance of our methods.
Let N = 14 days, and assume there are 10,000,000 users and that each had
100 close contact encounters each day5, we also assume that 50,000 people are
newly infected each day6.
5.1 Messaged-based protocols
5.1.1 User requirements
Setup Having installed the app the user must generate and store two seeds s
and t. Both will take up 128 bits so between them that is 32 Bytes. The user
must also encrypt their seeds and send the result to Mary or Henry (depending
on which message protocol is used), this can be contained in a single cipher-text
which will be no more than half a kilobyte.
Interactions The user must generate a new UID for every time period, this
is one call to CTR. The parties broadcast a 128bit UID, this uses 16 of the
available 20 Bytes in a BLE beacon so fits easily. The user must also store
every UID they receive for a period of 14 days. Assuming 100 interactions a
day this is 1400 UIDs together with a timestamp so that it is known when to
stop storing them. A UID and timestamp together will require no more than
26 Bytes, so the total required storage will be about 36 kB.
Upon Diagnosis Upon being diagnosed the user uploads all the UIDs they
have recently seen that is an upload of 36kB.
Receiving Updates The user must collect messages sent by Grace including
the dummy messages. Assuming a message every 30 minutes on average this is
48 messages a day. If the messages consist of a single indicator bit then they are
the size of the counter nA i.e. a few bytes, more informative messages would
have to be bigger. Even with a fairly long messages, a few bytes say (much more
information that this would probably de-anonymise the diagnosed person), the
communication cost is going to be dominated by the meta data of a connection
to Mary. Thus we expect the main communication cost to be the metadata
associated with receiving 48 messages a day.
5.1.2 Server requirements
Henry as health care provider Henry must receive and forward a 36kB
message for each diagnosed individual. He doesn’t need to store anything or
engage in any other steps in this role.
514 days is the current medically advised time period to consider. Considering 10,000,000
users is equivalent to using the system across an entire major city (e.g. London). Our
assumption of 100 close encounters a day is our own estimate.
6This is more than ten times the current rate of infection in the United Kingdom as of
April 7th
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Mary or Henry as message relay Mary in protocol 1 or Henry in protocol
2 must receive setup details from every new user and forward them together
with a pseudonym to Grace. This will mostly consist of a single cipher-text
and so the communication depends on the scheme but wouldn’t be much more
than half a kilobyte in and out. For every user this party will also have to
store the pseudonyms, which for 10,000,000 users could be a mere 3 bytes each,
together with the identity of each person. This could be only 20 Bytes per
user i.e. 200 MB total. For each of these users all messages from Grace will
have to be forwarded by this party, assuming a message every 30 minutes this
is 480,000,000 messages a day. Each message with consist of a pseudonym, a
counter and a masked message, which could be only 10 Bytes. Thus even if the
messages can’t be delivered immediately (because the user is unavailable) and
must be stored for a day on average this will require about 5GB of storage. This
5GB is also the amount of communication in and out each day, this should be
fairly evenly spread. on top of this there will also be however much metadata
is required for sending 480,000,000 messages each day, we expect this would be
of the order of tens of gigabytes.
Grace Grace must send the above 480,000,000 ten byte messages everyday,
this is 5GB but as they are all going to the same recipient their should be no
extra meta data required. Grace must also receive 36kB of data for every newly
diagnosed individual, with 50,000 individuals infected each day this is about
1.8GB a day. To store every message that is waiting to be sent in the next 30
minutes Grace would only need about 100MB of storage. Grace must store two
keys, a pseudonym and a counter for each user amounting to around 32MB. In
order to perform a lookup on a UID received from Henry, Grace will also want
to maintain a lookup table, this will have to hold every UID used in the last
14 days, that is 14 times 48 times 10,000,000 or about 7 billion entries each
returning a pseudonym of 3 Bytes. This will require tens possibly hundreds of
gigabytes of storage depending on implementation. A call shall be made to this
lookup table every time a UID is queried i.e. 70,000,000 times a day. This will
require a lot of computation.
5.2 Set-Based protocol
We consider the different phases of the protocol in turn.
Stage 1: Contact reporting In each interaction a user sends uid ∈ {0, 1}128
and s ∈ {0, 1}4. Assuming 100 interactions a day this means each user must
transfer no more than 1.65kB of data per day. Moreover, locally they must store
their contact set. This logs all interactions for the last 14 days. Each element
comprises of 2 UIDs, 2 shares and a timestamp. Assuming a timestamp requires
10 Bytes each element of the contact set requires 43 Bytes meaning the whole
set requires approximately 60 kB of local storage by the user.
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Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
User Storage 60kB - -
User Transfer - 1.7kB 0.36 MB
Govt Storage - 230GB -
User Enc Time - - 7s
Figure 3: A summary of the approximate overheads per day for our protocol
presented in Section 4, based on the assumptions given at the start of this
section.
Stage 2: Status Reporting In this stage the user constructs and sends their
status update set for that day to G. There are 100 elements in the status set
(100 interactions per day), each comprising of a UID, uid ∈ {0, 1}128 and an
indicator i ∈ {0, 1}4. Consequently the user must transfer approximately 1.7kB
of data to the government every day.
The government must store these sets for all users for the previous N days.
Assuming 10,000,000 users (the system is somehow split into regions) over 14
days this will require 230 GB.
Stage 3: Infection Learning In this stage the user uses an additively ho-
momorphic encryption scheme to learn if they have had an infected encounter.
We base our results on using the Paillier encryption scheme implementation
from [9]. We assume key size of 2048 bits, which is sufficient and recommended
according to NIST [10]. Using the results from [9] this means the user can
do 89,483 encryptions per second requiring 5.66 seconds of pre-compute time.
Therefore it will take less than a second for the user to encrypt all the 4 bit val-
ues in this stage along with the 5 seconds of pre-compute time. Given the user
must only do this once a day, this is very reasonable. Moreover, the user must
only transfer over the encrypted values of the indicators to the government for
the last N days, and not the UIDs they correspond to. Under our assumptions
the set comprises of 1,400 2048-bit encryptions meaning a message size of 0.72
MB.
As can be seen from the above analysis, the burden on the user is relatively
small which is important if this method is to be widely adopted.
6 Conclusion
In this work we have proposed two methods that allow for privacy preserving
contact tracing. Our first method expands on current implemented methods
(e.g. TraceTogether) for private messaging and our second leverages the ability
of the parties to exchange “secrets” at the time of interaction and additively
homomorphic encryption to solve the problem. Both our methods provide pri-
vacy for a user who is diagnosed with the virus, something that is not accounted
for in existing methods. Moreover, in Section 5 we show how our methods are
20
inexpensive and efficient, thus we believe they are of practical use in for the
current pandemic and future situations where contact tracing is needed.
References
[1] Can I say no to uploading my tracetogether data when contacted by the
ministry of health?” Singapore Government Blog, March 2020. Avail-
able at: https://tracetogether.zendesk.com/hc/en-sg/articles/
360044860414-Can-I-say-no-to-uploading-my-TraceTogether-
data-when-contacted-by-the-Ministry-of-Health-.
[2] Decentralized privacy-preserving proximity tracing. Available at: https:
//github.com/DP-3T/.
[3] Help speed up contact tracing with tracetogether,” Singapore Government
Blog, March 2020. Available at: https://www.gov.sg/article/help-
speed-up-contact-tracing-with-tracetogether.
[4] A. R. Beresford and F. Stajano. Mix zones: user privacy in location-
aware services. In IEEE Annual Conference on Pervasive Computing and
Communications Workshops, 2004. Proceedings of the Second, pages 127–
131, 2004.
[5] Alex Berke, Michiel Bakker, Praneeth Vepakomma, Ramesh Raskar, Kent
Larson, and Alex ’Sandy’ Pentland. Assessing disease exposure risk with
location histories and protecting privacy: A cryptographic approach in
response to A global pandemic. CoRR, abs/2003.14412, 2020.
[6] Hyunghoon Cho, Daphne Ippolito, and Yun William Yu. Contact tracing
mobile apps for COVID-19: privacy considerations and related trade-offs.
CoRR, abs/2003.11511, 2020.
[7] Ramsey Faragher and Robert K. Harle. An Analysis of the Accuracy of
Bluetooth Low Energy for Indoor Positioning Applications. pages 201–210,
September 2014.
[8] Milan Herrera Vargas. Indoor navigation using bluetooth low energy (ble)
beacons. 2016.
[9] Christine Jost, Ha Lam, Alexander Maximov, and Ben J. M. Smeets. En-
cryption performance improvements of the paillier cryptosystem. IACR
Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2015:864, 2015.
[10] NIST. Recommendation for pair-wise key establishment schemes using
integer factorization cryptography. 2009.
[11] Pascal Paillier. Public-key cryptosystems based on composite degree residu-
osity classes. In EUROCRYPT, volume 1592 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 223–238. Springer, 1999.
21
[12] Jonathan Petit, Florian Schaub, Michael Feiri, and Frank Kargl.
Pseudonym schemes in vehicular networks: A survey. IEEE Communi-
cations Surveys & Tutorials, 17:228–255, 03 2015.
[13] Ramesh Raskar, Isabel Schunemann, Rachel Barbar, Kristen Vilcans, Jim
Gray, Praneeth Vepakomma, Suraj Kapa, Andrea Nuzzo, Rajiv Gupta,
Alex Berke, Dazza Greenwood, Christian Keegan, Shriank Kanaparti, Rob-
son Beaudry, David Stansbury, Beatriz Botero Arcila, Rishank Kanaparti,
Vitor Pamplona, Francesco M Benedetti, Alina Clough, Riddhiman Das,
Kaushal Jain, Khahlil Louisy, Greg Nadeau, Vitor Pamplona, Steve Pen-
rod, Yasaman Rajaee, Abhishek Singh, Greg Storm, and John Werner.
Apps gone rogue: Maintaining personal privacy in an epidemic, 2020.
22
